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Abstract 
 
How do people decide what is right and wrong, 
and to what extent are their actions guided by such 
moral considerations? Inspired by philosophical 
traditions, early approaches to morality focused on 
rationality, and assumed that people arrive at 
moral standards by logical thought. More recently, 
however, psychologists have explored the 
influence of emotions and intuitions on morality, 
and evidence has been accumulating that moral 
decisions and behaviours are far from rational, but 
instead, are guided by intuitions and situational 
considerations. For example, seemingly irrelevant 
concerns such as keeping one’s mind and spirit 
clean and pure can change people’s moral 
judgment. Emotions can also influence behaviour, 
and positive, uplifting emotions such as elevation 
and gratitude can be harnessed to produce 
beneficial outcomes for individuals and 
organizations alike. Furthermore, people appear to 
aspire to an equilibrium of moral self-worth, and 
engage in more or less ethical behaviour 
depending on their currently perceived moral 
integrity. Thus, morality and ethical behaviour is 
less likely to reside in the person than in the 
context, and thus, for the study of spirituality it 
might be beneficial to focus on people’s 
situational constraints in the workplace rather than 
their stable dispositions. Further, because of their 
potential to inspire positive action, organizations 
might aim to make positive moral emotions, such 
as gratitude, elevation and awe part of everyday 
work contexts. Overall, in organizations and the 
workplace the goal shifts from trying to identify 
the moral individual to providing the contextual 
conditions that appeal to spiritual concerns in 
order to foster moral behaviour. 
 
 
In his book “The Happiness Hypothesis” Jonathan 
Haidt (2006) concludes an extensive review of insights 
from psychological research and works of ancient 
wisdom such as religious and philosophical writings 
with the following recommendation for the life lived 
well: “Just as plants need sun, water, and good soil to 
thrive, people need love, work, and a connection to 
something larger (p. 239).” This recommendation 
emphasizes the centrality of finding meaning in one’s 
work, and because illuminating people’s desire for a 
connection to something larger has been an emerging 
goal across many theoretical and practical disciplines 
(e.g., Elkins, 2001; Emmons & Paloutzian, 1999; Hill, 
Pargament, Hood, McCullough, Swyer, Larson, 
Zinnbauer, 2000; LaPierre, 1994; Miller & Thoresen, 
2003; Zinnbauer, Pargament, & Scott, 1999), recently 
various authors have started exploring how people’s 
spiritual experiences and religious practices relate to 
their work lives (e.g., Biberman & Tischler, 2008; 
Giacalone & Jurkiewicz, 2010a; Gotsis & Kortezi, 
2008; Mitroff & Denton, 1999) .  
Although the lack of acknowledged definitions 
of spirituality and religion has been pointed out as a 
factor in hampering research developments (e.g., 
Giacalone & Jurkiewicz, 2010b; Geh & Tan, 2009), in 
scientific psychology, tremendous progress has been 
made in areas in which definitional issues continue to 
stir debate, as is the case in the field of emotion. For 
example, one scientific volume entitled The Nature of 
Emotion: Fundamental Questions (1994) considers 
basic questions relating to definitional issues, with 
various eminent researchers giving their very distinct, 
and often contradictory answers. Although the eternal 
debates regarding definitional and other basic 
questions go on, in the meantime researchers seem to 
have decided to just “get on with it” and study 
emotional phenomena anyway. More problematic for a 
research field, however, is the lack of commonly 
agreed methods, which makes empirical evidence 
difficult to compare from study to study, therefore 
impeding progress, and this has been noted as a 
problem for the field of workplace spirituality 
(Giacalone & Jurkiewicz, 2010b; Gotsis & Kortezi, 
2008). Because of the lack of grounding of the 
approach in theory, Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2010b) 
suggest that studying workplace spirituality would 
greatly benefit from interdisciplinary links with 
research areas in which empirical progress has been 
made. One such area is the field of morality, which has 
recently seen a great resurgence in empirical interest in 
how emotions guide people’s moral choices.  
Although some argue that spiritual factors 
might not be open to being fully studied by traditional 
scientific methods (e.g., Biberman & Tischler, 2008), 
we disagree. A noted by others (Miller & Thorensen, 
2003), many unobservable psychological phenomena 
have been empirically studied with established 
methods with great success, such as implicit cognitive 
processes, emotional feelings, and, as we will review, 
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topics as elusive as what factors shape people’s moral 
considerations.  
 Morality concerns how people tell right from 
wrong, and has been studied by philosophers for 
thousands of years. Recently, the study of morality has 
moved from the philosopher’s armchair to the 
psychologist’s laboratory. It used to be assumed that 
moral decisions are based only on rational thought, 
such that people decide based upon objective facts and 
logical consideration what is morally acceptable 
behaviour. However, recent empirical findings suggest 
that decisions about morality and ethical behaviour are 
far from rational, but are often guided by emotion and 
other intuitions. In this paper we review some of the 
key findings in the emerging field of moral 
psychology, namely that people’s emotions and 
intuitions can influence their judgments and 
behaviours, and that people generally strive to confirm 
their moral self-worth. We then conclude with 
speculations and possible research questions applying 
these findings to the workplace.  
Within organizations and work contexts, 
decisions are made and actions are taken that can have 
various implications regarding the ethical conduct of 
an individual, or the organization as a whole. Factors 
involved in ethical behaviour on the level of 
organizations have been discussed in details by others 
(e.g., Collins, 2010; Schwepker, 2001; Tenbrunsel, 
Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003; Treviño, Weaver & 
Reynolds, 2006), and ethical climates have been 
investigated in the context of spirituality (Parbotheeah 
& Cullen, 2003). However, because the decision-
making within an organisation is generally made by 
individuals or small groups of individuals, the factors 
involved in ethical and moral decisions and behaviours 
that are relevant on the individual level equally apply 
to the organizational level, and this will be the focus of 
the present paper. 
 
Studying Morality – Early Beginnings 
 
Questions of morality have constituted a key domain 
within philosophy. Of particular interest has been 
normative ethics, namely how one ought to act and 
how moral standards are formed, and the extent to 
which people apply such standards when judging their 
own and others’ behaviours. Within philosophy, many 
thinkers have attempted to arrive at universal 
principles that if observed would result in exemplary 
moral behaviour. Kant (1788/1997), for example, in 
his Categorical Imperative proposed that there are 
absolute, objective truths within the moral domain and 
that it is our duty to use reason to discover these truths. 
Other philosophers also arrived at general rules on how 
people should behave. John Stuart Mill (1863) in his 
essay on utilitarianism declared that each individual 
must do whatever brings the greatest amount of 
happiness to the largest number of people. Such 
rational views within philosophy have been influential 
because they provide specific rules regarding how 
people should behave. However, it is important at this 
point in this discussion to observe that knowing how 
we should behave does not tell us how we actually do 
behave, or why. In contrast to this rational tradition, 
Hume (1751) proposed that because humans are 
sentimental beings, moral decisions cannot be purely 
derived through reason, and that instead, people rely 
on their feelings when deciding between right and 
wrong. 
Whereas philosophy has attempted to decide 
between different approaches to morality based on 
theoretical consideration, more recently empirical 
psychologists have tested specific hypotheses derived 
from different theories. Within psychology, rational 
models have been highly influential, and only recently 
a shift has taken place to move to more sentimentally-
inspired models. Kohlberg’s (1981) widely-cited work 
proposed that children progress through discrete stages 
of moral development as they acquire more and more 
advanced reasoning abilities, and that fully developed 
moral reasoning was so sophisticated that even many 
adults never reach the most advanced level of moral 
thought. In contrast to such rational models of 
morality, increasingly moral psychologists have taken 
seriously Hume’s early suggestion that moral decisions 
are guided by various feelings. The most influential 
such approach has been Haidt’s (2001) Social 
Intuitionist Model, which proposes that moral 
judgments are the result of automatic intuitive 
responses to moral stimuli that take place largely 
outside of conscious awareness, with people producing 
rational arguments only later when trying to justify 
their judgments. Others (e.g., Greene, 2007; Paxton & 
Greene, 2010) have suggested that both rational and 
emotional considerations can play a role, and although 
the precise contribution of emotion in moral judgment 
is still under discussion (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 
2009), evidence is accumulating to support the 
conclusion that emotions are critically involved in 
moral judgment.  
Within the growing field of moral psychology, 
several findings have emerged. First, people do not 
always only use rational thinking when deciding 
whether something is right or wrong. Instead, emotions 
and intuitions often guide people’s moral judgments. 
Second, moral emotions are fundamentally social, and 
can have profound effects on behaviour. Third, people 
aspire to an equilibrium of moral self-worth and 
engage in compensatory behaviour to either raise or 
lower their current level of moral worth. Empirical 
findings on which these conclusions are based will be 
reviewed next.  
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Looking Up: Embodied Metaphors of the Divine 
 
Haidt (2006) proposes that in general, social 
relationships consist of three dimensions that can be 
represented spatially. One dimension involves close 
interpersonal relationships to those who are next to us, 
and on the same level as us, namely friends and 
significant others. Another dimension concerns 
hierarchical relationships, for example, between a boss 
and an employee, or a teacher and a student. A third 
moral dimension can be spatially represented along the 
vertical, and consists of what Haidt (2006) termed the 
dimension of divinity, with or without god. This 
dimension concerns spiritual considerations that 
appear to be largely universal across different cultures, 
and involve the quest to look for something larger and 
higher than oneself. In the context of this vertical 
dimension, recent research findings from the newly 
emerging field of embodied cognition are very 
relevant.  
Approaches of embodied cognition suggest 
that the way we function in the world with, and 
through, our bodies, fundamentally shapes our 
cognitive processes (for reviews, see Barsalou, 2008; 
Spellman & Schnall, 2010). From this perspective, 
metaphors are considered to have a bodily basis, 
because they reflect direct physical experiences 
(Lakoff  & Johnson, 1980). For example, the spatial 
concept of verticality is easy to understand because 
human beings usually function in an upright position, 
and it is clear what is up, and what is down, relative to 
one’s body. The notion of verticality is invoked when 
considering good or bad things such as emotions, and 
using expressions such as “being on top of the world,” 
versus  “being depressed” or literally feeling pushed 
down, or de-pressed (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
However, these metaphors are not only used as figures 
of speech, but reflect underlying cognitive processes: 
People indeed seem to represent good things as 
spatially, up, and bad things as spatially down. For 
example, research participants are faster to categorize 
positive words as “good” when they are presented in 
the top section of a computer screen, and negative 
words as “bad” when they are presented in the bottom 
section (Meier & Robinson, 2004). Further, people 
relate verticality to the moral dimension, and 
automatically link morality and vertical space of up 
and down (e.g., being ‘‘high minded’’ vs. 
‘‘underhanded’’).  However, moral considerations and 
verticality are not associated by those who lack the 
awareness of social and moral concern: psychopaths 
(Meier, Sellbom, & Wygant, 2007). Furthermore, 
people not only think of all things good and moral as 
up, but they also think of God as up, and the Devil as 
down, and are faster to categorize words such as 
Almighty or Lord if presented in an up location, and 
Satan or Demon in a down location (Meier, Hauser, 
Robinson, Friesen & Schjeldahl, 2007). Not 
surprisingly, those in power are also conceptualized as 
being high up relative to those down below over whom 
they exert control (Schubert, 2005). It is thus no 
coincidence that people in charge of companies or 
organizations usually have their offices on the top floor 
of the building rather than in the basement. 
All this empirical evidence suggests that there 
is indeed a third, spiritual dimension that leads up, 
both literally and metaphorically. Surprisingly, this 
vertical dimension that pulls the mind up to 
considering what higher power there might be appears 
to be deeply rooted in the very basic physical 
experience of verticality. However, verticality not only 
influences people’s representation of what is good, 
sacred and divine, but movement through space along 
the vertical dimension can even change their moral 
behaviour. People in a shopping mall who had moved 
up an escalator were more likely to contribute to a 
charity donation box than people who had moved 
down on the escalator (Sanna, Chang, Miceli & 
Lundberg, 2011). Similarly, participants who had 
watched a film depicting a view from high above, 
namely flying over clouds seen from an airplane 
window subsequently showed more cooperative 
behaviour than participants who had watched a more 
ordinary, and less “elevating” view from a car window.  
The notion of verticality that elevates people is 
only one embodied metaphor that has consequences 
for spirituality; another such metaphor concerns 
people’s basic physical desire to keep the body clean 
and pure, and free of contamination. As will be 
reviewed in the next section, recent research has 
shown that changing one’s bodily state from dirty, 
disgusting and animal-like to clean, pure and God-like 
is often an attempt to reaching up higher; that 
“cleanliness is next to Godliness” has been a well-
recognized fact in many spiritual practices.  
 
Moral Foundations: Emotions and Other Intuitions  
 
In empirical psychology early work on morality built 
on rational approaches within philosophy and focused 
on concerns of preventing harm and maintaining 
fairness (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 1983). However, 
recent work has identified five moral foundations 
(Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009). Ensuring fairness and preventing harm to others 
are clearly important, but in addition, many societies 
uphold norms that do not relate to such objective 
standards. According to moral foundation theory, 
people aim to protect the rights of their own ingroup. 
In other words, I might judge whether something is fair 
or harmless differently depending on whether the 
person concerned is like me, or unlike me. Further, 
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many societies have both formal and informal rules to 
ensure that status and hierarchy are maintained and 
respected. Finally, individuals aim to maintain a pure 
body and spirit by avoiding physical contamination. 
This moral intuition of purity has generated a lot of 
research interest, presumably because more than any 
other intuition, it seems especially “irrational,” and yet, 
has proven to be highly influential because it has the 
potential to link up mere lowly mortals with the sacred 
forces high above.  
In this context, feelings of disgust constitute a 
threat to the desired state of physical and spiritual 
purity. Evolutionarily, disgust has several basic 
functions (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). On one 
level, disgust is thought to have evolved as an emotion 
that protects from various contaminants, such as spoilt 
food, bad taste and unpleasant odours, to ensure one 
does not take in substances that may be harmful or 
even deadly (Rozin et al., 2008). In addition to the 
avoidance of toxins that might be ingested by mouth, 
disgust also guards against the touching of 
contaminated substances, and of parasites and 
pathogens that might be harmful by contact, thus 
avoiding the dangers of infection and disease (Schaller 
& Duncan, 2007). Beyond this relatively basic, body-
based function, disgust responses have also been 
demonstrated in the social domain; socio-moral disgust 
is the term to describe the revulsion one feels when 
confronted with immoral behaviours of others that 
violate established norms (Rozin et al., 2008). Thus, 
bad people can be as disgusting as bad food.  
In addition to this food-based disgust, another 
type of disgust has been called animal nature disgust 
(Rozin et al., 2008), which describes people’s 
emotional response of repulsion whenever it is evident 
that human beings are evolutionarily very similar to 
other non-human animals. As a consequence, human 
bodily functions, especially those relating to bodily 
wastes and reproduction, are considered animal-like 
and therefore disgusting. People appear to have a 
desire to see themselves as enjoying a special, elevated 
status relative to other creatures, and therefore, they go 
to great efforts to distinguish themselves from animals. 
Presumably, the main reason for the discomfort 
associated with reminders of human beings’ animal 
nature is that they make salient one’s ultimate 
mortality. Thus, disgust is a complex emotion that 
despite its direct physical basis has various spiritual 
and moral implications.  
Although some have argued that using the 
term “disgust” when referring to moral transgressions 
is only metaphorical (Nabi, 2002), there is reason to 
believe that this is not the case. For example, 
functional neuroimaging studies have shown that the 
same brain structures are implicated in the experience 
of physical and socio-moral disgust (Moll et al., 2005; 
Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008). Further, 
experimental manipulations of physical disgust have 
been shown to influence people’s judgments of socio-
moral disgust. Wheatley and Haidt (2005) used 
hypnotic suggestion to induce participants to 
experience a brief pang of disgust whenever they read 
the emotionally neutral word “often” (or in a different 
condition, “take”). Subsequent judgments of moral 
wrongness indicated that participants rated other 
people’s behaviours as more wrong if the story 
contained that specific word, which triggered disgust. 
What makes such influence of emotions on judgments 
so difficult to control in everyday organizational 
contexts is the fact that people are usually not aware of 
this connection; in fact, research participants will often 
deny that they were influenced by anything other than 
rational consideration, and sometimes even 
“confabulate” when asked to give reasons for their 
judgments.  
Further tests of the implicit connection 
between physical and socio-moral disgust were 
conducted by Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008). 
In one study passers-by on a university campus were 
asked to rate a series of stories for moral wrongness. 
Unbeknownst to participants, the experimenter had 
sprayed a commercially available “fart spray” into a 
nearby trash can to create an unpleasant smell. Indeed, 
participants who were exposed to the disgusting smell 
of fart spray judged various moral transgressions, such 
as falsifying a resume or not returning a lost wallet, to 
be more wrong than participants who were not exposed 
to the smell. Similarly, in a different study, participants 
who happened to sit at a disgusting table surrounded 
by dirty pizza boxes and used tissues made more 
severe moral judgments than participants sitting at the 
same table when it was clean and tidy (Schnall, Haidt 
et al., 2008). All these findings suggest that 
participants in the disgust conditions conflated 
experiences of physical and moral disgust. In other 
words, the sense of “that’s disgusting!” was interpreted 
to be indicative of moral rejection when in fact the 
feeling was actually based on the irrelevant bad smell, 
or the dirty environment surrounding the person while 
making the judgment. Thus, a dirty work place might 
change the way people make moral decisions; further, 
it is likely that the actions of people who are typically 
considered disgusting (e.g., homeless people) might be 
judged especially harshly.  
Additional findings relating physical disgust to 
morality come from studies examining dispositional 
differences regarding a person’s tendency to be easily 
disgusted. Jones and Fitness (2008) found that jurors in 
a mock trial who were high on trait disgust sensitivity 
were more likely to issue a guilty verdict to a 
defendant in a rape trial. Further, the more sensitive 
people are to disgust, the more negative are their 
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attitudes toward homosexuality (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, 
& Bloom, 2009). Politically conservative attitudes are 
predicted by high levels of trait disgust sensitivity 
(Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009), and conservative 
people are more likely to consider disgusting (but non-
harmful) behaviours as immoral (Graham et al., 2009).  
All this research suggests that one’s own 
feelings of disgust can be (mis)interpreted as evidence 
of bad behaviours and bad people, and because such 
influences tend to occur outside of conscious 
awareness, they could negatively impact various 
organizational situations that require judging people’s 
character and abilities. In particular, with relevance to 
the workplace, the link between judgments about 
people, morality, and disgust highlights the need for 
objective procedures in the recruitment process, and 
when it comes to professional advancement within an 
organization, to avoid the influence of automatic 
disgust responses to groups such as homosexuals, the 
facially disfigured (Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003), 
or the obese (Puhl & Brownell, 2001). 
On the flip side of disgust, additional support 
for the moral intuition of purity has come from studies 
manipulating physical purity and looking at the effect 
on morality, and these studies show that people 
somehow equate physical purity with mental and 
spiritual purity. The first demonstration of this was 
aptly termed the “Macbeth Effect” after Lady Macbeth 
who desperately tried to alleviate her guilty conscience 
by washing her hands after having committed murder. 
Results from several studies showed that after being 
reminded of the immoral deeds they had committed in 
the past, participants showed a greater desire to wash 
themselves (Zhong & Liljenquest, 2006). Such 
cleansing desires are specific to the modality of the 
offense: After speaking immoral things people want to 
use mouthwash, but after typing something immoral 
people want to use a hand-sanitizer (Lee & Schwarz, 
2010a). Further, being primed with words related to 
cleanliness or engaging in hand washing can change 
people’s moral judgments, and make moral judgments 
less severe when they misattributed feelings of 
cleanliness to the transgressions under considerations 
(Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 2008), but less severe 
when the cleanliness is misattributed to the self 
(Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). Recent 
findings suggest that the effects of cleansing the hands 
can go beyond the moral domain, and, for example, 
reduce the cognitive dissonance that would otherwise 
be experienced after having made a difficult decision 
(Lee & Schwarz, 2010b). An intriguing possibility is 
that being clean is not merely the absence of disgust, 
but that the desire for cleanliness made possible one of 
the most basic behaviour among conspecifics, namely 
social grooming (Schnall, 2011). This might mean that 
being clean indicates to others that a person has good 
social relationships, and therefore is a good 
cooperative partner, a consideration that is critical in 
work contexts requiring reliability and trustworthiness.  
Thus, there might be something special about 
keeping the body clean in order to keep the spirit 
clean, and some people consider this especially 
important: A recent meta-analysis (Saroglou, 2010) of 
data from over 20,000 people from 19 countries 
concluded that the personality variable 
Conscientiousness, which indicates a desire for order, 
and doing things the “right way” is associated with 
various aspects of religiosity and spirituality, thus 
suggesting that cleanliness, tidiness and order can 
critically relate to moral aspects of life. 
Of course, disgust and cleanliness are not the 
only feelings that are relevant within moral contexts. 
Anger is typically the result of frustration because of 
the blocking of one’s goals (e.g. Plutchik, 1980). 
Within the moral domain, anger or moral outrage often 
results from witnessing immoral behaviors that result 
in harm to others (e.g. Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 
2007), and experiences of anger predict condemnation 
of moral transgressions involving justice violations 
(Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009).  
Anger is an emotion that is commonly 
experienced in the work place (for a review, see 
Gibson & Callister, 2010). The most frequently cited 
reasons for feeling anger are being treated unfairly or 
unjustly, such as having one’s contribution overlooked 
or being unfairly accused of an offense, and observing 
others’ unethical behaviour such as witnessing 
dishonesty (Fitness, 2000). How anger is perceived 
and whether it motivates specific action can differ as a 
function of the status of the person (e.g., boss vs. 
employee) experiencing it. Fitness (2000) found that 
interactions between supervisors and subordinates 
were situations that commonly triggered an anger 
response in either or both parties; within these anger 
eliciting situations, supervisors were much more likely 
to immediately confront the subordinate in an anger 
eliciting situation than subordinates confronting 
supervisors. In contrast, anger eliciting co-workers 
were confronted less often than subordinates, but more 
often than supervisors.  
Although witnessing moral transgressions can 
elicit both feelings of disgust and anger (Gutierrez & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2007), we have recently shown 
differential emotional responses as a function of the 
specific content of moral offenses (Cannon, Schnall, & 
White, 2011).  
We recorded the facial muscle activity relating to 
disgust and anger while participants considered third-
person statements describing good and bad behaviors 
across a range of moral domains. Facial disgust was 
highest in response to purity violations, followed by 
fairness violations. In contrast, harm violations evoked 
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anger expressions. Furthermore, the amount of facial 
muscle activity predicted participants’ moral 
judgments: Perceived severity of purity and fairness 
transgressions correlated with facial disgust, whereas 
harm transgressions correlated with facial anger. These 
findings suggest that people automatically show a 
quick emotional response when exposed to moral 
offenses, which in turn relates to their explicit moral 
judgments.  
 
Moral Emotions and Behaviour 
 
In addition to investigating how people decide what is 
right and wrong, researchers have also examined how 
people behave as a function of the specific moral 
emotions they experience. Of recent interest has been 
the role of positive moral emotions. Following the 
movement of  positive psychology (e.g., Keyes & 
Haidt, 2003), positive organizational scholarship has 
made it its mission to examine positive factors that 
make flourishing and resilience possible within 
organizational contexts (Cameron, Dutton & Quinn, 
2003), and to take a more balanced view of what is 
positive and negative about people’s behaviors 
(Luthans, & Yussef, 2007). Positive emotions have 
been noted to set in motion mutually beneficial 
processes of cooperation within workplace contexts 
(Sekerka & Fredrickson, 2010). For example, because 
gratitude is a profoundly social emotion that by 
definition requires at least two people, it can play a 
critical role in the interplay of people within 
organizations (Emmons, 2003). Further, well-being 
involving positive emotions in the workplace and 
productivity and profits are not mutually exclusive, but 
in fact, often go hand in hand (Harter, Schmidt, & 
Keyes, 2002). Thus, individuals’ striving for 
spirituality and transcendence might not be as 
incompatible with organizations’ goals as it might 
superficially appear (Ashford & Pratt, 2010).  
With regard to the embodied spatial metaphors 
mentioned above (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) some of 
these emotions are experienced as spiritually uplifting, 
elevating, and bringing people closer to higher goals. 
Algoe and Haidt (2009) explored the extent to which 
so-called “other-praising” emotions such as elevation, 
admiration and gratitude are different from more 
generic positive emotions such as happiness or 
amusement. These moral emotions were indeed found 
to result in different experiences and cognitive 
appraisals than basic positive moods.  
Elevation has been defined as the emotional 
reaction to moral excellence, that is, it is experienced 
when observing somebody perform a morally 
praiseworthy action (Haidt, 2003). One of the most 
critical consequences of feeling elevated and uplifted 
is the desire to also want to become a good person, and 
help others (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). In other words, 
when seeing somebody else do a good deed, people are 
inspired to also do a good deed themselves. Freeman, 
Aquino, and McFerran (2009) showed that induced 
feelings of elevation increased donations to a Black 
charity from people who are normally unlikely to 
contribute, namely Whites scoring highly on attitudes 
indicative of anti-Black racism.  
To induce elevation, recent work used a video 
clip from the television program the “Oprah Winfrey 
Show” in which a successful musician from a 
disadvantaged background thanks his mentor. The 
video clip shows the reunion between mentor and 
student and the emotional response of the mentor as he 
listens to the student describing how his life was 
changed by the support that he was given. Silvers and 
Haidt (2008) found that after watching this clip, 
mothers with young infants performed more positive 
social behaviours toward their infants, such as hugging 
and nursing, compared to mothers who watched a 
comedy clip that was merely entertaining. In other 
research using the same elevation-inducing clip, paid 
research participants who experienced elevation were 
more likely to volunteer to take part in a second unpaid 
study than participants who were in a neutral mood 
(Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010). Further, participants 
who experienced elevation helped the experimenter by 
completing a boring math questionnaire for much 
longer than participants who either watched a neutral 
or a comedy video clip (Schnall et al., 2010). Findings 
such as these suggest that moral emotions with 
powerful social implications can be elicited by 
uplifting and inspiring content presented in regular 
television programs. 
More specifically within organizational 
contexts, Vianello, Galliani and Haidt (2010) showed 
that when leaders showed self-sacrifice for the 
organization and demonstrated fair behaviour toward 
employees, this resulted in feelings of moral elevation 
in their subordinates, which in turn lead to greater 
commitment to the organization on their part. Thus, 
feelings of elevation can set in motion a host of 
beneficial thoughts and behaviours, presumably 
because when being presented with a moral role-
model, people feel inspired to live up to a high 
standard of moral excellence. 
In contrast to elevation where the observer 
does not directly benefit from a benefactor’s action, 
gratitude occurs when one is the actual beneficiary of 
another person’s intentional efforts to provide a 
benefit. In addition to wanting to pay back the 
benefactor, recipients report a desire to tell others 
about that person’s beneficial behaviour, which serves 
to enhance the benefactor’s reputation (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009). People further engage in increased helping 
behaviour when they feel gratitude, and do so not only 
THE CLEAN CONSCIENCE AT WORK    7 
 
toward their benefactors, but also toward strangers 
(Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). Gratitude, however, is 
more than just the desire to repay one’s benefactor and 
reciprocate other people’s kindness and generosity, 
perhaps in order to get rid of possibly unpleasant 
feelings of indebtedness. One critical function of it 
appears to be the initiation and maintenance of lasting 
personal relationships (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008). 
In romantic relationships, feelings of gratitude were 
found to be predictive of relationship quality for both 
recipient and benefactor (Algoe, Gable, & Maisel, 
2010). In organizational contexts, gratitude can create 
lasting work relationships that are beneficial for the 
individuals concerned, as well as the organization as a 
whole (Emmons, 2003). Further, spiritual people 
report higher levels of gratitude on a daily basis than 
people who do not consider themselves spiritual, 
presumably because they experience a relationship to 
something greater than themselves (McCullough, 
Emmons & Tsang, 2002).  
On the side of the benefactor, expressions of 
gratitude compel people to engage in yet more 
prosocial behaviour, both toward those who thanked 
them, but also toward others (Grant & Gino, 2010). 
For example, fund raisers for a university who 
received an explicit expression of gratitude from their 
boss made about 50% more fundraising calls on behalf 
of their university than their colleagues who had not 
been thanked. 
Both moral elevation and gratitude have thus 
been found to inspire prosocial behaviour. Admiration, 
as another positive emotion that is distinct from 
general positive emotions such as happiness (Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009), occurs when one is impressed by another 
person’s skill or ability outside the moral domain, for 
example, by another person’s athletic of intellectual 
accomplishments. When feeling admiration, people 
describe being energized and motivated to work hard 
to achieve their own goals, so in contrast to elevation 
and gratitude that are oriented toward other people and 
enhancing relationships with them, admiration 
increases the focus on the self and one’s personal goals 
and aspirations (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). 
Among the positive moral emotions, the one 
that stands out as being especially related to feelings of 
transcendence is awe, which is defined by two 
features: First, a feeling of being overwhelmed by the 
recognition that something is greater than the self, and 
second, a need for accommodation, that is, an attempt 
to comprehend a process or entity that is difficult to 
understand because it is so different from ordinary 
experience (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Experiences of 
awe and transcendence may have powerful effects on 
people’s relationships with others, and their personal 
connection to work, but to date, there has been very 
little empirical research on the topic, presumably 
because it is difficult to induce states of awe, which by 
definition are extraordinary, in typical experimental 
situations. Existing evidence (Shiota, Keltner, & 
Mossman, 2007) suggests that thinking of an awe-
inspiring experience from the past leads to seeing 
oneself as part of a greater whole, and experiencing 
self-diminishing emotions such as feeling small and 
insignificant, and feeling the presence of something 
greater than the self. Further research is needed to 
explore the benefits of this self-transcendent emotion 
on people’s lives, both in private and work situations.  
The research reviewed above in the context of 
positive moral emotions suggests that sometimes 
feelings that people are not even aware of can 
influence their actions. In addition to emotional 
factors, other incidental factors can influence people’s 
moral behaviour. Social factors influence whether 
people follow norms. In an office environment where 
people took milk for their tea or coffee but often did 
not contribute to the cost, Bateson, Nettle and 
Robertson (2006) simply put up a poster on the wall, 
and alternated between posters with a pair of eyes or 
with a control image of flowers. When exposed to the 
eyes, people paid more often for the milk than when 
exposed to the control image, presumably because on 
some level the eyes invoked the sense of social 
presence, of being watched. In contrast, people engage 
in more immoral behaviour when they feel like nobody 
is watching them: Participants cheated more in a 
poorly lit room than a brightly lit room, and behaved 
more selfishly when they wore sunglasses (Zhong, 
Bohns, & Gino, 2010). This finding suggests that when 
feeling relatively anonymous, people feel that social 
norms are less binding. Finally, other environmental 
factors play a role: When listening to music with 
prosocial lyrics, people put more money in a donation 
box for a non-profit charity than participants listening 
to music with neutral lyrics (Greitemeyer, 2009). Thus, 
as is the case for moral judgment, moral actions can be 
sparked by incidental factors that have very little to do 
with rational consideration or logical analysis. 
 
Striving for Moral Equilibrium 
 
People are keen to view themselves as morally good. 
Somebody who cheats on his income taxes, has the 
occasional extramarital affair and never visits his ill 
mother in the nursing home can probably come up 
with plenty of reasons and justification for his 
behaviour, and on some level may still feel like he is 
overall a pretty decent, morally-upstanding person. 
Perhaps he donates to charity on a regular basis, 
recycles old newspapers and drives a hybrid car, and 
when questioned about his not-so ethical behaviours, 
he might be quick to point to his more ethical pursuits. 
Indeed, research evidence is accumulating to suggest 
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that when people’s positive moral self-concept is 
questioned, they engage in various behaviours 
intended to restore it, as if wanting to assure 
themselves that they are indeed “good” people. In 
contrast, when people are relatively certain about their 
moral integrity, they are not motivated to do any 
further good, a phenomenon termed “moral licensing” 
(Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & Miller, 
2001; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong, 
Liljenquist & Cain, 2009). In other words, in people’s 
mind one good deed prevents the need for another.  
In one of the earliest studies on this 
phenomenon, Monin and Miller (2001) provided some 
of their participants with an opportunity to affirm their 
credentials as non-prejudiced people, for example, by 
disagreeing with sexist statements or making a hiring 
decision in favour of a person from a stereotyped 
ethnic group. In subsequent tasks those participants 
exhibited more prejudicial opinions than participants 
who did not have the earlier opportunity of showing 
themselves to be unbiased. In other words, people who 
in one context showed that they were not prejudiced 
acted all the more prejudiced in a subsequent context. 
Further, in a study on political attitudes, participants 
who in a first task indicated a voting preference for 
Barak Obama favoured Whites in a second task 
(Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). 
In addition to moral licensing in stereotyping, 
it has also been examined with respect to prosocial 
behaviour. Sachdeva and colleagues (2009) conducted 
experiments that allowed participants to think of 
themselves in a favourable light before being provided 
with the opportunity to engage in helping behaviour. 
Participants who had copied positive trait words and 
used them in a story about themselves indicated they 
would donate less to a charity and cooperate less in an 
environmental task than participants who wrote a story 
involving neutral words. Presumably, thinking about 
their own positive qualities confirmed participants’ 
moral integrity, and as a consequence, reduced any 
desire to engage in prosocial behaviour.  
Monin (2007) proposed that when people 
witness another person’s exceptional moral behaviour, 
they engage in a process of upward social comparison, 
which may indicate that one’s own moral actions are 
below standard. One response to this threat is to 
engage in a behaviour that restores one’s self-worth, 
such as helping somebody in need. Inspiring role 
models thus either motivate people to also excel, or 
prompt them to become defensive and downplay the 
accomplishments of the model (e.g., Lockwood & 
Kunda, 1997). Nelson and Norton (2005) showed that 
priming participants with the general category of 
“superhero” led to increased helping, whereas priming 
with the specific exemplar of “Superman” led to 
decreased helping. Experimental instructions were to 
describe the characteristics of a superhero (or of 
Superman), and to list behaviors and values associated 
with such a superhero (or Superman). Thus, in their 
work, being confronted with a specific person that was 
morally good at a level beyond what was humanly 
possible made people question their own moral 
credentials. 
With respect to ethical behaviour in the real 
world, Mazar and Zhong (2010) showed that after 
engaging in ethical, “green” consumerism, people 
sometimes make up for it later on. Participants who in 
a research study engaged in “green” consumer choices 
showed more lying and stealing in the same study 
(Mazar & Zhong, 2010).  
Across time, people alternate between ethical 
and unethical decisions (Zhong, Ku, Lount, & 
Murnighan, 2010). MBA students were presented with 
moral dilemmas involving business situations, such as 
keeping surplus gift vouchers that are intended for 
company employees, or keeping quiet when a 
company offers you a great job because they 
mistakenly believe that you graduated at the top of 
your class. When dealing with multiple such 
dilemmas, ethical decisions early on led to unethical 
decisions later on, and vice versa. It is almost as if 
people use another embodied concept, namely the 
notion of balance, which is derived from the physical 
sensation of keeping one’s body balanced (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980) when keeping track of their own moral 
and immoral actions. Based on these findings on what 
they term compensatory ethics, Zhong and colleagues 
(2010) note a provocative implication for the work 
place: Managers should refrain from praising their 
employees’ moral standards, because this could lead to 
subsequent immoral action. Instead, questioning 
others’ moral standards might compel them to engage 
in moral action in order to increase their moral self-
worth.  
 
Morality in the Workplace: Possible Implications 
 
The present review has focused on emotional and 
situational factors that influence moral decisions. Of 
course, individual differences need to be considered as 
well. Not only do people differ in terms of how 
important being a moral person is to them (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002), but they also differ in terms of how 
susceptible they are to organizational pressures to do 
immoral things (Comer & Vega, 2011), and such 
dispositional factors require further research attention. 
We have seen that the study of moral and ethical 
behaviour can be split into the study of what one ought 
to do and how one actually does it. Although it might 
seem intuitive that careful thought and consideration 
are essential to arrive at ethical decisions,  such 
assumptions about the rational nature of how we make 
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day-to-day moral decisions have been challenged by 
the mounting evidence supporting intuition-based 
approaches (e.g., Haidt, 2001). In fact, contrary to 
what one might expect, having more time to deliberate 
before making a decision on a moral dilemma actually 
can lead to less ethical decisions than when having 
little time to think carefully (Zhong, Ku et al., 2010). 
Based upon the most recent evidence, the 
following conclusions can be drawn. First, moral 
judgments and decisions are not always guided by 
rational consideration, but instead, are influenced by 
seemingly irrelevant concerns such as avoiding feeling 
disgust, and seeking out clean states of body and mind. 
As such, the moral domain is no different from other 
domains of cognitive processing, for which ample 
evidence suggests that much processing takes places 
outside of conscious awareness (cf. Wilson, 2002). 
Second, emotions can also influence behaviour, and 
positive moral emotions such as elevation and 
gratitude can be harnessed to produce beneficial 
outcomes for individuals and organizations alike. 
Third, people appear to keep track of their moral self 
worth, and aspire to a certain level of moral 
equilibrium, and their behaviour is aimed to maintain 
this moral equilibrium. 
What are the implications of this research for 
people’s spiritual concerns in the workplace? Based on 
common sense one might think that the best way to 
ensure that ethical standards are followed in an 
organizational context is to find people who have high 
moral standards, and put them in charge. Similarly, 
just like morality can be considered as something that 
resides in a person or as something that manifests itself 
in specific behaviors in certain contexts, spirituality 
can both refer to what a person is and what a person 
does (Giacalone & Jurkiewicz, 2010b). Based on the 
research we reviewed, morality and ethical behaviour 
is less likely to reside in the person than in the context, 
and thus, for the study of spirituality it might be 
equally beneficial to focus on people’s situational 
constraints in the workplace rather than their stable 
dispositions. In this context, we agree with Giacalone 
and Jurkiewicz’s (2010b) conclusion that not 
separating religion and spirituality may hamper 
scientific progress because many stable religious 
beliefs and persuasions are difficult to test empirically, 
whereas situational concerns related to spirituality can 
be studied in much the same way as some of the 
factors involved in the study of morality. In addition, 
while promoting religion in the work place can be 
problematic because it might open itself up to 
subjective, faith-based considerations (Mitroff, 2003), 
this is less of a concern when dealing with more 
transient spiritual factors.  
Further, definitional problems of religion and 
spirituality can be overcome by operationalizing 
various aspects of spirituality in terms of specific 
values (Jurkiewicz & Giacalone, 2004). They outline a 
list of specific values that are implicated in spirituality 
in the workplace. Such an approach has the distinct 
benefit of making it possible to link the existing 
research findings generated within experimental 
psychology (for a review see Maio, 2010) with 
consideration of spirituality, thus allowing direct 
empirical tests. As far as morality is concerned, two 
specific values from Jurkiewicz and Giacalone’s 
(2004) list that are relevant within spirituality are 
integrity and justice; however, as reviewed above, 
somewhat counterintuitive values such as purity can be 
highly influential as well.  
The goal of work environments has to be to 
produce positive outcomes, ideally for the individual 
and the organization alike. However, sometimes 
because of the very pressures that come with 
responsibilities distributed across many people, 
seemingly good intentions can have disastrous 
consequences when individuals fail to appreciate all 
consequences of their actions (Adam & Balfour, 
1998). But people not only do evil things 
unintentionally or due to lack of consideration, but 
sometimes the same evolved principles that provide 
the basis for moral concerns can be co-opted to 
produce moral evil (Graham & Haidt, in press). For 
example, in the same way in which identification 
toward one’s ingroup can inspire loyalty, when turned 
against others it can seemly justify harsh treatment of 
traitors, or members of the outgroup. Similarly, respect 
for authority and tradition can form the foundation for 
social institutions, but equally lead to unspeakable 
atrocities (Graham & Haidt, in press). Organizations 
therefore have to take great care that group processes 
do not lead to the erosion of norms such that immoral 
actions become seemingly acceptable simply because 
group standards have shifted.  
The conclusion that morality appears to be not 
so much inherent to a  person, but instead emerges 
from situational constraints that determine a person’s 
emotions and motivations, suggests one important 
take-away message, namely that while moral character 
and moral values are probably important (Bass & 
Steidlmeier, 1999), there are various additional factors 
that reside in the situation. This may be good news and 
bad news at the same time: On the one hand, this 
means that most people are neither extremely virtuous 
nor extremely evil. Thus, a company may not need to 
try to identify ways to find the most ethical person 
when it comes to hiring decisions, because on average, 
most people anyway have the desire to feel that they 
are morally upstanding individuals. On the other hand, 
if relatively minor factors such as one’s current mood 
can have consequences for people’s morality, it might 
be difficult to try to intentionally influence or control 
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all such factors. 
Given the potential of positive moral emotions 
to inspire positive action, it might be especially 
worthwhile to consider how such experiences can 
become part of everyday work contexts. For example, 
overt displays of gratitude and appreciation can be 
very rewarding not just for the individual, but for the 
organization as a whole (Grant & Gino, 2010). Further, 
witnessing people in power do “the right thing” leads 
to feelings of moral elevation, which in turn cement 
employees’ identification with their company 
(Vianello et al., 2010). Finally, feelings of awe and 
transcendence could be made part of company-level 
retreats, by sharing extraordinary experiences of 
nature, or participating jointly in special cultural 
events. These are just a few possibilities; if one takes 
seriously the notion that positive emotions create 
social bonds and moral commitments, many other 
possibilities may open up.  
If emotional factors play such an important 
role, should attempts be made to find leaders that are 
high on emotional intelligence (Mayer, Roberts, & 
Barsade, 2008)? Although this might be useful in some 
respects, Kilduff, Chiaburu and Menges (2010) have 
pointed to the “dark side” of emotional intelligence, 
namely the fact that people who are good at certain 
aspects of emotional intelligence (e.g., reading other 
people’s emotions or strategically modulating their 
own emotions) can use this ability to their own 
advantage in highly competitive work situations. 
In general, a classic finding in social 
psychology is that when making sense of others’ 
behaviour, people tend to overestimate the contribution 
of the person’s character (“he’s prone to anger”) 
relative to the contribution of the situation (“somebody 
insulted him”) (Jones & Harris, 1967). As we have 
reviewed, plenty of situational factors can influence 
whether people consider others’ behaviour moral or 
immoral, and whether they themselves act morally or 
immorally. For organizational and work contexts, an 
important implication is therefore that in order to 
facilitate moral and ethical behaviour, the goal is not 
so much the search for the moral person who would 
then be an ideal leader or employee, but to provide the 
contextual conditions that facilitate ethical conduct. 
Further, because many of the factors linking spiritual 
and moral concerns operate on an emotional and 
intuitive level, stimulating relevant emotional 
experiences of elevation, admiration and awe in the 
workplace might be more effective that trying to target 
people’s conscious metal strategies. Doing so might 
appeal directly to people’s intrinsic desire of reaching 
for higher meaning while keeping a clean conscience.  
 
 
 
References 
Adam, G. B., & Balfour, D. L. (1998). Unmasking  
administrative evil. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Ashford, B. E., & Pratt, M. G. (2010). Institutionalized  
spirituality: An oxymoron? In R. A. Giacalone & 
C. L. Jurkiewicz (Eds.), Handbook of workplace 
spirituality and organizational performance (2nd 
edition, pp. 44-58). Armonk, NY: Sharpe.  
Algoe, S. B., Gable, S. L., Maisel, N. (2010). It’s the little  
things: Everyday gratitude as a booster shot for 
romantic relationships. Personal Relationships, 17, 
217-233.  
Algoe, S. B., Haidt, J., & Gable, S. L. (2008). Beyond  
reciprocity: Gratitude and relationships in everyday 
life. Emotion, 8, 425-429. 
Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. D. (2009). Witnessing excellence  
in action: The "other-praising" emotions of 
elevation, gratitude, and admiration. Journal of 
Positive Psychology, 4, 105-127. 
Aquino, K. & Reed, A. (2002). The self-importance of  
moral identity. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83, 1423-1440. 
Bartlett, M. Y., & DeSteno, D. (2006). Gratitude and  
prosocial behavior: Helping when it costs you. 
Psychological Science, 17, 319-325. 
Barsalou, L.W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review  
of Psychology, 59, 617-645.  
Bass, B. M., & Steidlmeier, P. (1999). Ethics, character, and  
authentic transformational leadership behavior. 
Leadership Quarterly, 10, 181-217. 
Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being  
watched enhance cooperation in a real-world 
setting. Biology Letters, 3, 412-4. 
Biberman, J. & Tischler, L., (2008). Introduction. In J.  
Biberman & L. Tischler, (Eds.), Spirituality in 
business: Theory, practice and future directions 
(pp. 1-16). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Borg, J. S., Lieberman, D., & Kiehl, K. A. (2008). Infection,  
incest, and iniquity: investigating  the neural 
correlates of disgust and morality. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 1529-1546. 
Cameron, K. S., Dutton, J. E., & Quinn, R. E. (2003).  
Foundations of positive organizational scholarship. 
In K. S. Cameron, J. E. Dutton & R. E. Quinn 
(Eds.), Positive organizational scholarship: 
Foundations of  a new discipline (pp. 3-13). San 
Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koheler. 
Cannon, P. R., Schnall, S., & White, M. (2011).  
Transgressions and expressions: Affective  
facial muscle activity predicts moral judgments. 
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 
325-331. 
Collins, D. (2010). Designing ethical organizations for  
spiritual growth and superior performance: An 
organization systems approach. Journal of 
Management, Spirituality & Religion, 7, 95-117. 
Comer, D. R., & Vega, G. (2011). The relationship between  
the personal ethical threshold and workplace 
spirituality. Journal of Management, Spirituality 
and Religion, 8, 23-40. 
Effron, D. A., Cameron, J. S., & Monin, B. (2009).  
Endorsing Obama licenses favoring Whites. 
THE CLEAN CONSCIENCE AT WORK    11 
 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, 
590-593. 
Ekman, P., & Davidson, R. J. (1994) (Eds.). The nature of  
emotion: Fundamental questions. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Elkins, D. N. (2001). Beyond religion: Toward a humanistic  
spirituality. In K. J. Schneider, J. T. Bugenthal, & 
J. F. Pierson (Eds.), The handbook of humanistic 
psychology: Leading edges in theory, research and 
practice (pp. 201-212). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Emmons, R. A. (2003). Acts of gratitude in organizations. In  
K. S. Cameron, J. E. Dutton, & R. E. Quinn (Eds.). 
Positive organizational scholarship (pp. 81-93). San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. 
Emmons, R. A., & Paloutzian, R. F (2003). The psychology  
of religion. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 377-
402.  
Fitness, J. (2000). Anger in the workplace: an emotion script  
approach to anger episodes between workers and 
their superiors, co-workers and subordinates. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21, 147-162. 
Freeman, D., Aquino, K., & McFerran, B. (2009).  
Overcoming beneficiary race as an impediment to 
charitable donations: Social dominance orientation, 
the experience of moral elevation, and donation 
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 35, 72-94. 
Geh, E. & Tan, G. (2009). Spirituality at work in a changing  
world: managerial and research implications. 
Journal of Management, Spirituality & Religion, 6, 
287-300. 
Giacalone, R. A., & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (2010a). The science  
of workplace spirituality. In R. A. Giacalone & C. 
L. Jurkiewicz (Eds.), Handbook of workplace 
spirituality and organizational performance (2nd 
edition, pp. 3-26). Armonk, NY: Sharpe.  
Giacalone, R. A., & Jurkiewicz, C. L. (Eds.) (2010b).  
Handbook of workplace spirituality and 
organizational performance (2nd edition). Armonk, 
NY: Sharpe.  
Gibson, D. E., & Callister, R. R. (2010). Anger in 
organizations: Review and integration. Journal of 
Management, 36, 66-93. 
Gotsis, G., & Kortezi, Z. (2008). Philosophical foundations  
of workplace spirituality: A critical approach. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 78, 575-600. 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2009). Liberals and  
conservatives use different sets of moral 
foundations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 96, 1029-1046. 
Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (in press). Sacred values and evil 
adversaries: A moral foundations approach. In in P. 
Shaver & M. Mikulincer (Eds.), The social 
psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of 
good and evil. New York: APA Books. 
Grant, A., Gino, F. (2010). A little thanks goes a long way: 
Explaining why gratitude expressions motivate 
prosocial behavior, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 98, 946-955. 
Greitemeyer, T. (2009). Effects of songs with prosocial  
lyrics on prosocial thoughts, affect, and behavior. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 
186-190. 
Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In W.  
Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, Vol. 3 
(pp. 35–79). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gutierrez, R., & Giner-Sorolla, R. S. (2007). Anger, disgust, 
and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-
breaking behaviors. Emotion, 7, 853-868. 
Harter, J. K., Schmidt, F. L., & Keyes, C. L. (2003). Well- 
being in the workplace and its relationship to 
business outcomes: A review of the Gallup studies. 
In C. L., Keyes & J. Haidt (Eds.). Flourishing: The 
positive person and the good life (pp. 205-224). 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association. 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A  
social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. 
Psychological Review, 108, 814-834. 
Haidt, J. (2003). Elevation and the positive psychology of  
morality. In C.L.M. Keyes & J. Haidt (Eds.), 
Flourishing: Positive psychology and the life well-
lived (pp. 275–289). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Haidt, J. (2006). The happiness hypothesis: Finding modern  
truth in ancient wisdom. New York: Basic Books.  
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind: How 5 sets  
of innate moral intuitions guide the development of 
many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even 
modules. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, and S. 
Stich (Eds.) The Innate Mind, Vol. 3. New York: 
Oxford, pp. 367-391. 
Hill, P. C., Pargament, K. I., Hood, R. W., McCullough, M.  
E., Swyer, J. P., Larson, D. B., Zinnbauer, B. J. 
(2000). Conceptualizing religion and spirituality: 
Points of commonality, points of departure. Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 30, 51-77. 
Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., Keltner, D., & Cohen, A. B.  
(2009). Disgust and the moralization of purity. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 
963-976.   
Huebner, B., Dwyer, S., & Hauser, M. D. (2009). The role  
of emotion in moral psychology. Trends in 
Cognitive Science, 13, 1-6. 
Hume, D. (1751). An enquiry concerning the principles of 
morals. London, UK: A. Millar. 
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives  
are more easily disgusted. Cognition & Emotion, 
23, 714-725. 
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009).  
Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of 
gays. Emotion, 9, 435-439. 
Jones, A., & Fitness, J. (2008). Moral hypervigilance: The  
influence of disgust sensitivity in the moral 
domain. Emotion, 8, 613-627. 
Jones, E. E. & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of  
attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 3, 1-24. 
Jurkiewicz, C. L., & Giacalone, R. A. (2004). A values 
framework for measuring the impact of workplace 
spirituality on organizational performance. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 49, 129-142. 
Kant, I. (1997). A critique of practical reason (M. Gregor,  
Trans.). Cambridge, UK:  
THE CLEAN CONSCIENCE AT WORK    12 
 
Cambridge University Press. (Original work 
published 1788). 
Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (2003). Approaching awe, a moral,  
spiritual, and aesthetic emotion. Cognition and 
Emotion, 17, 297-314. 
Keyes, C. L. M., & Haidt, J. (Eds.). (2003). Flourishing:  
Positive psychology and the life well lived. 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association. 
Kilduff, M., Chiaburu, D. S., & Menges, J. I. (2010).  
Strategic use of emotional intelligence  
in organizational settings: exploring the dark side. 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 30, 129-152. 
Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: 
The Philosophy of Moral Development. San 
Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
LaPierre, L. L. (1994). A model for describing spirituality.  
Journal of Religion and Health, 33, 153-161. 
Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010a). Of dirty hands and  
dirty mouths: Embodiment of the moral purity 
metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved 
in moral transgression. Psychological Science, 21, 
1423-1425. 
Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010b). Washing away  
postdecisional dissonance. Science, 328, 709. 
Lockwood, P. & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars and me: 
Predicting the impact of role models on the self. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 
91-103. 
Luthans, F., & Youssef, C. M. (2007). Emerging positive  
organizational behavior. Journal of Management, 
33, 321-234. 
Maio, G. R. (2010). Mental representations of social values. 
In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology (Vol. 42, pp. 1-43). Burlington: 
Academic Press.  
Mayer, J. D., Roberts, R. D., & Barsade, S. G. (2008).  
Human abilities: Emotional intelligence. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 59, 507-536. 
Mazar, N., & Zhong, C. B. (2010). Do green products make  
us better people? Psychological Science, 21, 494-
498. 
McCullough, M. E., Emmons, R. A., & Tsang, J. A. (2002).  
The grateful disposition: A conceptual and 
empirical topology. Journal of Social and 
Personality Psychology, 82, 112-127.  
Meier, B. P., Hauser, D. J., Robinson, M. D., Friesen, C. K.,  
& Schjeldahl, K. (2007). What’s “up” with God? 
Vertical space as a representation of the divine. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 
699-710.  
Meier, B. P., & Robinson, M. D., (2004). Why the sunny  
side is up: Associations between affect and vertical 
position. Psychological Science, 15, 243.  
Meier, B. P., Sellbom, M., & Wygant, D. B. (2007). Failing  
 to take the moral high ground: Psychopathy and 
the vertical representation of morality. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 43, 757.
Merritt, A. C., Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Moral  
self-licensing: When being good frees us to be bad. 
Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/5, 
344-357. 
Mill, J. S. (1863). Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son, and  
Bourn. 
Miller, W. R., & Thoresen, C. E., (2003). Spirituality,  
religion and health: An emerging research field. 
American Psychologist, 58, 24-35. 
Mitroff, I. I. (2003). Do not promote religion under the guise  
of spirituality. Organization, 10, 375-382. 
Mitroff, I., I., & Denton, E. A. (1999). A spiritual audit of  
corporate America: A hard look at spirituality, 
religion, and values. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Moll, F., Ignacio, F.,  
Bramati, I., Caparelli-Daquer, E., et al.  
(2005). The moral affiliations of disgust: a 
functional MRI study. Cognitive and Behavioral 
Neurology, 18, 68-78. 
Monin, B. (2007). Holier than me? Threatening social  
comparison in the moral domain. International 
Review of Social Psychology, 20, 53-68. 
Monin, B., & Miller, D.T. (2001). Moral credentials and the  
expression of prejudice. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. 
Nabi, R. (2002). The theoretical versus the lay meaning of  
disgust: implications for emotion research. 
Cognition and Emotion, 16, 695-703. 
Nelson, L. D. & Norton, M. I. (2005). From student to 
superhero: Situational primes shape future helping. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 
423-430. 
Parbotheeah, K. P., & Cullen, J. B., (2010). Ethical climates  
and spirituality. In R. A. Giacalone & C. L. 
Jurkiewicz (Eds.), Handbook of workplace 
spirituality and organizational performance (2nd 
edition, pp. 99-113). Armonk, NY: Sharpe.  
Park, J. H., Faulkner, J., & Schaller, M. (2003). Evolved  
disease avoidance processes and contemporary 
anti-social behaviour: Prejudicial attitudes and 
avoidance of people with physical disabilities. 
Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour, 27, 65-87.  
Paxton, J. M., & Greene, J. D. (2010). Moral reasoning:  
Hints and allegations. Topics in Cognitive Science, 
2, 511-527. 
Plutchik, R. (1980). Emotion: A psychoevolutionary  
perspective. New York: Harper and  
Row. 
Puhl, R., & Brownell, K. D. (2001). Bias, discrimination,  
and obesity. Obesity Research, 9, 788-805. 
Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. R. (2008). Disgust. In  
M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of 
emotions (3rd ed., pp. 757-776). New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints  
and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-
regulation. Psychological Science, 20, 523-528. 
Sanna, L. J., Chang, E. C., Miceli, P. M., & Lundberg, K. B.  
(2011). Rising up to higher virtues: Experiencing 
elevated physical height uplifts prosocial actions. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 
472-476. 
Saroglou, V. (2010). Religiousness as a cultural adaptation  
THE CLEAN CONSCIENCE AT WORK    13 
 
of basic traits: A five-factor  
model perspective. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 14, 108-125. 
Schaller, M., & Duncan, L. A. (2007). The behavioral  
immune system: Its evolution and social 
psychological implications. In J. P. Forgas, M. G. 
Haselton, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), Evolution and 
the social mind: Evolutionary psychology and 
social cognition (pp. 293–307). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Schnall, S. (2011). Clean, proper and tidy is more than the  
absence of dirty, disgusting and wrong. Emotion 
Review, 3, 264-266. 
Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a clean  
conscience: Cleanliness reduces the severity of 
moral judgments. Psychological Science, 19, 1219-
1222. 
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008).  
Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1096-1109. 
Schnall, S., Roper, J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2010). Elevation  
leads to altruistic behavior. Psychological Science, 
21, 315-320.  
Schubert, T. W. (2005). Your highness: Vertical positions as  
perceptual symbols of power. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 1-21. 
Schwepker, C. H. (2001). Ethical climate’s relationship to  
job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and 
turnover intention in the salesforce. Journal of 
Business Research, 54, 39-52.  
Sekerka, L. E., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2010). Working 
positively toward transformative cooperation. In A. 
Linley, S. Harrington & N. Garcea (Eds.). Oxford 
Handbook of positive psychology and work (pp. 81-
94). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., & Mossman, A. (2007). The 
nature of awe: Elicitors, appraisals, and effects on 
self-concept. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 944-963. 
Silvers, J., & Haidt, J. (2008). Moral elevation can induce  
lactation. Emotion, 8, 291-295. 
Spellman, B. A., & Schnall, S. (2009). Embodied rationality.  
Queen’s Law Journal, 35, 117-164.  
Tenbrunsel, A. E., Smith-Crowe, K., & Umphress, E. E.  
(2003). Building houses on rocks: The role of the 
ethical infrastructure in organizations. Social 
Justice Research, 16, 285-307. 
Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006).  
Behavioral ethics in organizations: A review. 
Journal of Management, 32, 951-990. 
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge:  
Morality and convention. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Vianello, M., Galliani, E. M., & Haidt, J. (2010). Elevation  
at work. The effects of leaders’ moral excellence. 
Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 390 - 411. 
Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotic disgust makes  
moral judgments more severe. Psychological 
Science, 16, 780-784. 
Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering  
the adaptive unconscious. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Zhong, C. B., Bohns, V. K., & Gino, F. (2010). A good 
lamp is the best police: Darkness increases 
dishonesty and self-interested behavior. 
Psychological Science, 21, 311-314. 
Zhong, C. B. & Liljenquist, K. A. (2006). Washing away  
your sins: Threatened morality and physical 
cleansing. Science, 313, 1451-1452. 
Zhong, C. B., Liljenquist, K. A. & Cain, D. M. (2009).  
Moral self-regulation: Licensing and compensation. 
In D. De Cremer (Ed.), Psychological perspectives 
on ethical behavior and decision making (pp. 75-
89). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.  
Zhong, C. B., Strejcek, B., & Sivanathan, N. (2010). A clean  
self can render harsh moral judgment. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 859-862. 
Zhong, C. B., Ku, G., Lount, R. B., & Murnighan, J. K.  
(2010). Compensatory ethics. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 92, 323-339. 
Zinnbauer, B. J., Pargament, K. I., & Scott, A. B. (1999).  
The emerging meaning of religiousness and 
spirituality. Journal of Personality, 67, 889-919. 
